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Labor Arbitration and Bankruptcy: A Trek into
the Serbonian Bog*
By
Thomas R. Haggard**
I. INTRODUCTION
The employer/employee relationship, though heavily regulated
by statute, is still contractual in nature. In the unionized sector of
the economy this contract, called a "collective bargaining agree-
ment," defines wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment for each employee represented by the union. Because
of the complex and specialized nature of this contract, the parties
customarily agree that all disputes arising under it will be resolved
by private arbitration rather than the normal judicial processes.'
Nourished by a favorable legal climate, labor arbitration has
evolved into an extensive and sophisticated system of industrial ju-
risprudence, drawing its sustenance from the practices and tradi-
tions of the workplace, from the expertise of labor arbitrators, and
from the fact that it deals with an ongoing relationship between an
employer and the union that represents its employees.
When a business is or threatens to become insolvent, however,
its contract and other legal disputes are normally removed to a
specialized forum, that of bankruptcy. The bankruptcy forum
* "A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog,. . . where armies whole have sunk." J.
MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book II, 1.592. The reference is to a "large marshy tract of
land in the northern part of ancient Egypt in which entire armies are said to have been
swallowed up." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1302
(1966). It is an apt description of this area of the law, and of the perils of venturing into
it!
** Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., University
of Texas at Austin, 1964; LL.B., University of Texas School of Law, 1967. Research for
this article was financed by a grant from the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust to the Indus-
trial Research Unit, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to his colleagues Dennis Nolan, Philip Lacy, Howard Stravitz,
and Lewis Burke for their comments and suggestions, and to Deborah Williamson Witt,
Class of 1986, for her assistance. The views expressed herein are, however, entirely those
of the author.
This article will appear in revised form as a chapter in a book on labor law and bank-
ruptcy, to be co-authored by Mark Pulliam and published by the Industrial Research
Unit, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See A. ZACH & R. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION 83 (1983).
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provides "a distinct system of jurisprudence the nature of which is
to sort out all of the debtor's legal relationships with others, and to
apply the principles and rules of the bankruptcy laws to these
relationships." 2
Because bankruptcy courts have tended to be jealous of their ju-
risdictional prerogatives,3 two jurisdictional conflicts have arisen in
the labor contract area. The first is between the district courts and
their bankruptcy counterparts. The second is between the bank-
ruptcy courts and private arbitration. The purposes of this article
are to explore the nature of these conflicts and to suggest a possible
accommodation.'
II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE COMPETING
JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Labor Arbitration
The jurisdictional claims of arbitration are firmly embedded in
federal law. Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act states that the
preferred method for resolving industrial disputes is that chosen by
the parties themselves.5 In the vast majority of cases the parties
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement which contains an arbi-
tration clause.6 Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act also gives the
federal district courts jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of
such agreements.7 Moreover, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
2. BANKR. LAW ED. Summary § 1:1, at 5 (1985)(emphasis added).
3. See Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 615 (1934); International Union v. Davis (in
re Muskegon Motor Specialties Co.), 313 F.2d 841, 842 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
832 (1963); Brookhaven Textiles, Inc. v. Avondale Mills, Inc. (in re Brookhaven Tex-
tiles), 21 Bankr. 204, 206, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
4. See generally Berger, The Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Does the
Duty to Arbitrate Survive?, 35 LAB. L.J. 685 (1984); Comment, Partial Repudiation and
the Survivability of Labor Arbitration Agreements in the Context of Bankruptcy, 1 BANKR.
DEV. J. 177 (1984). A similar conflict has arisen between the bankruptcy laws and the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982), which manifests a federal policy in
favor of and facilitates the use of arbitration in commercial disputes. See Deitrick, The
Conflicting Policies Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33 (1984); Krein-
dler, The Convergence ofArbitration and Bankruptcy, 26 ARB. J. 34 (1971); Note, Balanc-
ing Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act and Section 1471 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: A Bankruptcy Judge's Exercise of "Sound Discretion", 53 CIN. L.
REV. 231 (1984); Note, Bankruptcy Law-Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings: The Clash Between Policies and the Proper Forum for Resolution, 57 TEMPLE
L.Q. 855 (1984); Annot., 72 A.L.R. FED. 890 (1985).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
6. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 1:1 (BNA
1983) (grievance and arbitration provisions found in all 400 labor contracts examined in
the BNA survey).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
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Mills,' the Supreme Court held that section 301 authorized the fed-
eral courts to create a federal "common law" of labor contracts,
one tenet of which was that arbitration provisions could be specifi-
cally enforced. 9
Subsequently, in the famous Steelworkers Trilogy'0 of cases, the
Court further enhanced the status of arbitration as the nearly ex-
clusive forum for the resolution of labor contract disputes. In
United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,"I the first case
of the trilogy, the Court held that courts "have no business weigh-
ing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity
in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular
language in the written instrument which will support the
claim."' 2 Rather, "[w]hether the moving party is right or wrong is
a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator."' 3
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 4 the
second case in the trilogy, the Court indicated that the existence of
a contractual duty to submit to arbitration is a threshold issue that
the court must necessarily decide before it can order arbitration.
Nonetheless, the Court, in order to avoid the possibility of inadver-
tently resolving the issue on the merits, held that "[a]n order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of any interpretation that covers the asserted dis-
pute.' II And in the final case of the trilogy, United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,6 the Court held that an arbitra-
tor's decision is final on the merits; a reviewing court can set an
arbitration award aside only if the arbitrator has clearly gone be-
yond the terms of the contract and the scope of his authority. '7 In
sum, federal law posits that the arbitration forum should have vir-
tually exclusive jurisdiction over labor contract disputes, leaving
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. Id. at 456-58. At common law, executory agreements to arbitrate were revocable
at any time by either party, and thus could not be specifically enforced. D. NOLAN,
LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 36 (1979).
10. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
11. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
12. Id. at 568.
13. Id.
14. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
15. Id. at 582-83.
16. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
17. Id. at 596-97.
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the federal district courts with only a narrow channeling and su-
pervisory function.
B. Bankruptcy
The jurisdictional claims of bankruptcy, on the other hand, are
more uncertain and complicated than those of the arbitration fo-
rum. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "1898 Act"), 8 the
bankruptcy court had "summary jurisdiction" over two kinds of
matters: proceedings in bankruptcy and controversies arising in
proceedings in bankruptcy.19 The former pertained to administra-
tive and other matters internal to the bankruptcy system itself, and
the latter were limited to matters in which the court had actual or
constructive possession of the res involved in the dispute.2" If a
dispute did not fall within the summary jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, then it was necessary for a party to bring a plenary
action in a state court or the federal district court.2'
This divided jurisdiction proved unsatisfactory because of the
delay that it caused and the expense it imposed on the bankruptcy
estate.22 Accordingly, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 (the "1978 Act"),23 which significantly extended the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts by giving them original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all "bankruptcy cases."' 24 The 1978 Act
also provided for original but not exclusive jurisdiction in the
bankruptcy courts over all "civil proceedings arising out of, arising
under, or relating to a bankruptcy proceeding. ' 25 The 1978 Act's
broad jurisdictional grant gave the bankruptcy court both in per-
sonam and in rem jurisdiction to handle everything that arises in a
bankruptcy case.26 As a result, actions that formerly had to be
tried in state court or in federal district court, at great cost and
delay to the estate, could now be tried in the bankruptcy courts.27
However, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chandler Act,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
19. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 23.02-.06 (14th ed. 1976).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) (referring to the need "to elimi-
nate the serious delays, expense and duplications associated with the current dichotomy
between summary and plenary jurisdiction").
23. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-82 (1982).
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471(a),(c) (1982).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982).
26. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977).
27. Id.
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Pipe Line Co.,28 the Supreme Court held that this broad grant of
jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the
1978 Act granted article III powers to the bankruptcy court which,
because its judges were not appointed for life, was not itself an
article III court.29 Congress, after much travail and delay, finally
responded to the Marathon decision in the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the "1984 Amend-
ments"). 30 The jurisdictional provisions of the 1984 Amendments,
which are patterned after the emergency rule promulgated by the
Court following its Marathon decision, are extremely obscure and
confusing. As one leading commentator recently put it,
"[U]nderstanding the matter is not easy. At least until some gifted
judicial mind definitively resolves certain matters, it defies simple
summarization. ' 31 But in relevant part, this is what the law
provides:
Section 1334(a) of the 1984 Amendments states that "[e]xcept as
provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11
[the Bankruptcy Code]." 32 The exclusive jurisdiction covers the
filing of the bankruptcy petition itself and the issuance of the final
order for relief; how much more it covers is a matter of some dis-
pute.33 Section 1334(b) provides that "the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11.1 34 The use of the phrases "arising under," "arising in," and
"related to" was apparently intended to make federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction as broad and all-encompassing as possible - although
the precise meaning and constitutionally permitted scope of these
terms has yet to be determined by the courts.3"
Section 1334 of the 1984 Amendments is very similar to section
1471 of the 1978 Act.36 The difference, however, lies in the fact
28. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
29. Id. at 87.
30. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
31. Cowans, The Bankruptcy Court and its Jurisdiction, 42 Bankr. 17, 25 (1984)
(printed in supplement to advance sheet only; materials taken from ch. 1, §§ 1.1-1.4 of
the forthcoming COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, to be published by West
Publishing Co.).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West Supp. 1977-1984) (emphasis added).
33. Cowans, supra note 31 at 27.
34. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp. 1977-1984) (emphasis added).
35. See Cowans, supra note 3 1, at 28.
36. Section 1471 of the 1978 Act provides:
a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11 ....
1986]
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that section 1334 grants jurisdiction to the federal district court
rather than to the bankruptcy court as such. Indeed, the 1984
Amendments contain no express grant of jurisdiction to any bank-
ruptcy court - a change obviously intended to obviate the consti-
tutional difficulty found by the Court in Marathon Oil. While
section 1334 does not expressly grant jurisdiction to a bankruptcy
court, section 151 of title 28 provides that "[in] each judicial dis-
trict, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall consti-
tute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy
court for that district. '37 And section 157(a) of the same title
states that "[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the
bankruptcy judges for the district. ' 38 Notwithstanding the merely
permissive nature of this grant of authority which suggests some
degree of discretion on the part of the district courts, practice
under the emergency rules and the probable intent of Congress
suggest that the district court refer all section 1334 matters to the
bankruptcy judges for initial consideration. 39  However, section
157(d) provides that for cause shown the district court may with-
draw all or part of the cases it refers to the bankruptcy judge and
that "the district court shall, on timely motion of a party, ...
withdraw a proceeding [referred under this section] if the court
b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on
a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11 . . .or arising in or related to cases under title 11 ....
c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 . . .is
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on
the district courts.
d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a
bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a
particular proceeding arising under title 11 ... or arising in or related to a
case under title 11 .... Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not
reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 ... is commenced shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor, as of the commencement of such case.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982).
Section 1334 of the 1984 Amendments provides: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the States, of all matters and proceedings in
bankruptcy." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1977-1984).
37. 28 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1968-1984).
38. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a) (West Supp. 1968-1984) (emphasis added).
39. See generally B. WIENTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
§§ 6.03, 6.03A (Cum. Supp. No. 2 1984); Developments, Jurisdiction: A New System for
the Bankruptcy Courts, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 9, 13 (1985).
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determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration
of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating orga-
nizations or activities affecting interstate commerce."
40
Some of the matters that can be referred under section 157 are
designated by the statute as "core proceedings. ' 41 As the name
suggests, these are integral to the bankruptcy process itself, and
Congress apparently intended that these particular matters should
be dealt with by the bankruptcy court.42 More specifically, "core
proceedings" are matters over which the bankruptcy judge may
issue final orders or judgments; unless the parties assent, only the
district court may issue a final order or judgment over non-core
proceedings.43 Core proceedings include "matters concerning the
administration of the estate," 4 the "allowance or disallowance of
claims against the estate, '4 5 "counterclaims by the estate against
persons filing claims against the estate,"46 "motions to terminate,
annul, or modify the automatic stay,"'4 7 "determinations as to the
dischargeability of particular debts,"'4 and "other proceedings af-
fecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment
of the debtor-creditor . . . relationship. ' 49 Each of these "other
proceedings" is potentially relevant to the enforcement, through
arbitration, of a collective bargaining agreement.5"
To be sure, this collage of statutory provisions presents a confus-
ing and obscure jurisdictional picture, and it is difficult to know
where even some of the more traditional bankruptcy law issues fit
into the statutory scheme. However, it does seem relatively clear
that the statute gives bankruptcy judges the power to hear and fi-
nally resolve most breach of contract claims against the debtor or
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(d) (West Supp. 1968-1984)(emphasis added).
41. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
42. See King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 679-80 (1985).
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
45. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
47. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(G) (West Supp. 1968-1984). The automatic stay referred
to in the list of core proceedings applies to, among other things, "the commencement or
continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administra-
tive, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been com-
menced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added).
48. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(I) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
49. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(O) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
1986]
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the estate5 - subject, of course, to the district courts' exercise of
the referral power, the assent of the parties in some instances, and
the right to appeal.
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE
The question, then, is this: How can the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy forum over the debtor's general contract liabilities be re-
conciled with the jurisdiction of the arbitration forum over the
debtor's breaches of a special kind of contract, the collective bar-
gaining agreement? Or more precisely, as between the federal dis-
trict court, the bankruptcy judge, and a labor arbitrator, who shall
decide which issues?
There is no easy answer to the question. In resolving it one can,
however, look to the literal words of the 1984 Amendments, to the
broader purposes and policies of both bankruptcy and labor law,
and to the cases that were decided under the 1978 and 1898 stat-
utes, to the extent that they remain relevant. In addition, one
would hope that a fair amount of common sense and due regard
for the practicalities of the situation would influence the resolution
of the issue.
IV. ALLOCATING JURISDICTION: SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The two sets of "jurisdictional" struggles which occur in this
area are first, between the federal district court and the bankruptcy
component of that court, and second, between the bankruptcy
court and arbitration. Some general principles or "presumptions"
about how jurisdiction ought to be allocated will be outlined first.
A. The District Court versus the Bankruptcy Court
The allocation of jurisdiction under the 1984 Amendments,
though obscure, recognizes that:
[t]here are certain types of problems which seem to many people
to be so inherently a part of what happens in a bankruptcy that it
is agreed that the bankruptcy court should decide them ["core
proceedings"]. At the other extreme are disputed rights and
causes of action that involve no points of bankruptcy law and
have no other connection with bankruptcy than that they are as-
51. "Contract claims, while not explicitly mentioned by § 157(a)(2)(B), are drawn
squarely within the powers of the bankruptcy judge to determine the allowance or disal-
lowance of claims." W. NORTON & R. LIEB, NORTON ON BANKRUPTCY 105-06 (Mono-
graph No. 1, 1985). The authors question the constitutionality of allowing a non-article
III court to decide a breach of contract claim. Id. at 106-10.
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serted by or against a debtor or trustee. 2
Presumably, the bankruptcy court should hear cases falling in
the first category, and the district court should hear the others.
But those are the clear cases; the problem is with cases that fall
between the two extremes.
One can, however, begin with the proposition that the 1978 Act
was intended to vest the bankruptcy courts with as broad a juris-
diction as was possible.53 The 1984 Amendments, which were ne-
cessitated by the Marathon Oil decision, should be read as
narrowing that jurisdiction only to the extent necessary to obviate
the constitutional problems. Thus, if there are labor contract is-
sues involving a bankrupt employer which clearly require a judicial
resolution, then the presumption should be that it is the bank-
ruptcy court rather than the district court that should hear them,
at least initially. In such a case the burden is on the party asserting
district court jurisdiction to show that such a forum is either con-
stitutionally or statutorily required.
B. The Bankruptcy Court versus an Arbitration Tribunal
The current Bankruptcy Code contains no express reference to
arbitration or its relationship with the bankruptcy process.5 4 Indi-
rectly, however, section 1334(c) (1) permits absention "in the inter-
est of justice. ' 55 Although this section is worded in terms of the
"district court," it probably also applies to the bankruptcy court
and could perhaps be used in favor of the arbitration forum in an
appropriate case. Moreover, section 362(d)(1) allows for relief
52. Cowans, supra note 31, at 25.
53. The House Report states that "the combination of the three bases for jurisdiction,
,arising under title 11,' 'arising under a case under title 11,' and 'related to a case under
title 11,' will leave no doubt as to the scope of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
disputes." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445-46 (1977). Cowans states that
in the above quoted sentence "the authors seem to be saying that . . . the bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction in every way they could." Cowans, supra note 31, at 28.
54. Section 26 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 authorized the trustee in bankruptcy or
the receiver to submit matters to arbitration and outlined the procedures that were to be
followed. I 1 U.S.C. § 49 (repealed 1978). This provision was omitted in the Bankruptcy
Code, although an abbreviated version of it has been carried forward in Bankruptcy Rule
9019(c) which provides: "On stipulation of the parties to any controversy affecting the
estate the court may authorize the matter to be submitted to final and binding arbitra-
tion." I I U.S.C. Rule 9019(c) (Supp. 11 1984). Some courts had held that these statutory
arbitration procedures were intended to apply only where the parties had not otherwise
agreed to arbitration. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312,
319 (2d Cir. 1976), on remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd per curiam, 567 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). But see Johnson v. England, 356
F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(1) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
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from the operation of the automatic stay,16 again suggesting that in
some instances a forum other than that of bankruptcy, such as ar-
bitration, may be the proper one in which to resolve a particular
issue. The question is when the arbitration forum should be used.
Courts should begin with the presumption that claims predi-
cated on an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement
should be established in the manner agreed to by the parties. As
contemplated by federal law, this should be done through the arbi-
tration process by a person with expertise in construing this type of
contract." But it is clear that a claim involving an interpretation
of the federal Bankruptcy Code must be decided by the bankruptcy
court itself. Among the issues that bankruptcy courts have re-
served to themselves in the past, and which they should continue
to reserve, are whether the duty to arbitrate survives a filing in
bankruptcy,58 the effect of a court-approved rejection of the con-
tract,59 the extent to which an order confirming a reorganization
plan operates as a discharge of workers' claims under the con-
tract,6° and the status and priority of contract claims.6'
The difficulty arises when the underlying issue is basically one of
contract interpretation rather than bankruptcy law as such but an
arbitration decision on that issue might nevertheless impact nega-
tively on legitimate bankruptcy interests. In this situation the gen-
eral rule should be that the policy in favor of arbitration must bend
to the policy in favor of the primacy of bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion. The interests of creditors in the assets of the estate and of
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
57. See In re Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 126, 128 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (sug-
gesting that while "certain exigent circumstances" might justify denial of the arbitration
forum, this would be an "extraordinary action" which this court would not take when the
grievance involves merely a wrongful discharge).
58. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 431 F. Supp. 646, 655 (E.D.N.Y.),
afl'd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 925 (1978).
59. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1976),
on remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), ajf'd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
60. L.O. Koven & Bros. v. Local 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 201 (3d
Cir. 1967).
61. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 321 n.15 (2d Cir. 1976),
on remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); see also L.O. Koven & Bros. v. Local 5767, United
Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1967) (whether vacation benefits constituted
wages for priority purposes); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 961 (1966) (whether the claimed monies were "trust funds" and whether em-
ployees were entitled to a preference in payment); In re Penn Fruit Co., 1 Bankr. 714
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (whether a claim was entitled to priority as an administrative
expense); accord In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 33 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
[Vol. 17
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society as a whole in the successful revitalization of the business
should take precedence over the narrow interests of the employer
and its employees in obtaining the bargained-for forum for resolu-
tion of their contract disputes.62
V. FACTORS MITIGATING AGAINST DEFERRAL
To ARBITRATION
If the accepted principle is that arbitrators should decide con-
tract disputes unless those disputes implicate important bank-
ruptcy interests, then the next determination is what those interests
are and how they might be jeopardized by the use of arbitration.
One area of concern involves the remedies or relief that an arbitra-
tor might order. For example, in Local 807, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Bohack Corp.,63 the bankruptcy court had
authorized the arbitrator to decide whether the contract rejected
by the employer should be specifically enforced by the reinstate-
ment of each employee who had been laid off by the alleged breach.
The district court felt that such a remedy would encroach upon the
prerogatives of bankruptcy. The district court noted that "in al-
lowing rejection of the contract, the bankruptcy judge found that
Bohack could not attain financial viability and at the same time
employ Local 807 drivers. If the arbitrator is now allowed to rein-
state terminated employees, the rejection of the contract becomes
meaningless."'
Similarly, in Local 692, United Food Workers v. Pantry Pride,65
the union first petitioned the bankruptcy court for relief from an
62. L.O. Koven & Bros. v. Local 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 205 (3d
Cir. 1967).
[W]e hold that questions involving an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
should be decided by the court, while questions involving an interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement should iffeasible be decided by the arbitra-
tor, unless they involve special bankruptcy interests. If such interests are present,
then the proper forum should be dictated by the needs of the particular case,
and this is a matter best left to the discretion of the trial court.
Id. (emphasis added). The court expressly recognized that some issues may affect bank-
ruptcy interests even though their resolution does not necessarily involve an interpreta-
tion of bankruptcy law as such. Id. at 202. The Koven court further held that the effect
of a release on claims later asserted by the union was a matter for the arbitrator to decide,
since the interests of the receiver were not involved and since the decision on that issue
would have no effect on claims actually processed in the chapter 11 proceeding. Id. at
204.
63. 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), afld per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
64. Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
65. 522 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1981).
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automatic stay so that it could sue to compel arbitration. The peti-
tion was granted, but on the condition that no court or arbitrator
would have jurisdiction "to interfere with the going-out-of-business
sales presently being conducted by the debtors, the sale of leases, or
the closing of the Baltimore area stores."66 The union then sued to
compel arbitration and for an injunction compelling the employer
to continue to provide health care coverage pending the outcome
of that arbitration. The district court granted the motion to com-
pel arbitration, but denied the injunction. The court reasoned that
the union's sole remedy against Pantry Pride for closing its stores
was monetary damages. Neither the district court nor an arbitra-
tion forum had the jurisdiction or authority to stop the closing of
the area stores or to preserve the jobs of the affected employees.
Even after arbitration Pantry Pride would not be required to con-
tinue paying health and welfare premiums.67
Even if an arbitrator is allowed to determine the amount of dam-
ages arising from a breach of contract, the bankruptcy court
should still have ultimate jurisdiction over enforcement of the
award.6 This will allow the court to determine the status and pri-
ority of the claim69 and whether it is subject to equitable
subordination.7 °
In the past, some courts have declined to defer to arbitration if
the grievance involved a monetary claim that would have to be
paid out of funds in which other creditors also had an interest. For
example, in Johnson v. England,7 ' the union demanded arbitration
over the debtor-employer's past failure to fund adequately a pen-
sion plan as required by the collective bargaining agreement. The
Ninth Circuit held that this was not an appropriate issue for arbi-
tral determination. The court, emphasizing that this case involved
a complete liquidation of the business rather than merely a reor-
ganization, noted that:
66. Id. at 1014.
67. Id. ; see infra text accompanying notes 128-37.
68. See, e.g., In re Sterling Mining Co., 21 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982); In re
Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 126, 128 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); see also Gottfried Baking
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 386 (Benewitz, Arb., 1966); Marathon City Brewing Co., 45
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 453 (McCormick, Arb., 1965).
69. See supra note 61.
70. P. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 9-6 (1982). See generally
DeNatale & Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination As Applied to Nonmanage-
ment Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417 (1985).
71. 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966); see also In re F & T
Contractors, Inc., 649 F.2d 1229, 1232 (6th Cir. 1981) (commercial arbitration); In re
Brookhaven Textiles, 21 Bankr. 204, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (commercial
arbitration).
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[t]his does not present the type of grievance which is ordinarily
the subject of arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
pursuant to § 301(a) [of the Taft-Hartley Act]. Such controver-
sies usually involve disputes between the union and the current
operating employer and are generally of such character that they
lend themselves most readily to solution through arbitration. In
that type of case the arbitrators "sit to settle disputes at the plant
level--disputes that require for their solution knowledge of the
customs and practices of a particular factory or of a particular
industry as reflected in particular agreements. 7 2
The court also noted that although the employer had breached
the contract, "the result was merely that the employees became
creditors to the extent of that default, '7 3 with just another claim on
the assets of the debtor-employer. Thus, the court concluded that
"the controversy which now arises is between two groups of credi-
tors . . . . On the one hand we have the employees and on the
other we have the other general creditors such as creditors for mer-
chandise sold."74 The court reasoned that "a decision of an arbi-
trator here would involve interests of parties who never consented
to arbitration, namely, the trustee in bankruptcy and the general
creditors. They ought not to be bound by the decision of an arbi-
trator selected by the employer and the union. ' ' 75
The court's reasoning, however, is not persuasive on either
point. The assertion that the dispute was not of the kind ordinarily
handled by arbitration was apparently predicated on the belief that
arbitrators function more as informal mediators of disputes about
working conditions and employment practices76 than as adjudica-
tors of claims for monetary amounts, and that bankruptcy should
thus defer to arbitration only when the former function is being
performed, rather than the latter. This is a two-fold misconcep-
72. 356 F.2d at 51 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
73. 356 F.2d at 51.
74. Id.
75. Id; see L.O. Koven & Bros. v. Local 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196,
203 (3d Cir. 1967); accord In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 22 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982), affd sub nom. Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
76. See In re F & T Contractors, Inc., 649 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981).
Now, if this were a situation where the internal affairs of the Defendant [the
bankrupt employer], based upon maybe its rules of procedure such as a union
might have, were at issue, working conditions, et cetera, then I would think that
this would be particularly within the realm of arbitration, but every one of these
issues . . . are tried out every day before a Court as a part of a law suit.
Id. at 1232-33.
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tion. The subject matter of arbitration involves both kinds of dis-
putes, and in either event the arbitrator's exclusive function is to
construe the contract, not to act as some roving, ad hoc "problem
solver." Moreover, the expertise of a labor arbitrator is in constru-
ing the specialized contract, whether the dispute involves an al-
leged failure to follow agreed-upon work practices, an alleged
breach of the duty to pay the agreed-upon wages, or an alleged
breach of the duty to pay into the pension fund, as in Johnson v.
England." In sum, federal policy in favor of arbitration does not
recognize the distinction the Johnson court was apparently draw-
ing between various types of arbitral disputes.
Also, the fact that, in Johnson, the union's pension fund claims
would have to be paid out of the liquidation assets of the employer
does not necessarily mean that only the bankruptcy court could
decide the claim. Indeed, the Johnson court suggested that an-
other form of arbitration could be resorted to in order to determine
the amount of the claim, namely, the arbitration forum provided
for by the 1898 Act itself."8 But if another forum can decide the
amount, then it would seem that the forum used should be the one
that the parties themselves have selected. If the theory is that an
arbitrator is required in order to construe properly the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, then the amount of money to
which the claimants have a right (an issue which the court said
someone else could decide) is inexorably connected to the forum
that the parties have selected for the resolution of the controversy.
The fact that the other creditors have not consented to that forum
is no more relevant than the fact that they have also not consented
to a contract giving the employees a pension fund in any amount.
The Supreme Court has stated that "an arbitration agreement
must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons
who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration
agreement."79 Moreover, if the amount to which the employees
are contractually entitled is fairly determined by a labor arbitra-
tor,8 0 the status and priority of that claim are still subject to deter-
77. See Johnson, 356 F.2d at 51-52; supra note 54 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983).
80. The Johnson court implied that it would not be fair for the other creditors to be
bound by the decision of an arbitrator picked only by the now defunct employer and the
contracting union. 356 F.2d at 51. Similarly, if only the employer had standing to con-
test the union's claim in the arbitration forum, resort to that forum would be obviously
unfair since, in a straight bankruptcy, the employer may lack both the interest and the
resources to contest adequately the claim against the estate. Neither concern, however, is
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mination by the bankruptcy court. There the interests of the other
creditors can be adequately protected.
The fact that the Johnson case involved a straight bankruptcy
rather than a reorganization may be relevant in another respect,
however. In a reorganization, the contracting employer generally
will also be appointed the debtor in possession, and it is this com-
bined entity that will defend against the union's claim before the
arbitrator. The cost of this defense is no greater than it would be in
a non-chapter 11 situation. But in a straight bankruptcy, the con-
tracting employer fades out of the picture, and the responsibility
for contesting claims against the estate falls on the appointed
trustee.8 ' This trustee will normally be an attorney who, though
familiar with business and commercial matters, may be totally un-
familiar with the practice and procedure of labor arbitration. The
retention of special labor counsel may be required, thus putting an
additional financial burden on the estate. Of course, even if the
litigation occurs in court rather than before an arbitrator, the
trustee may still find it necessary to retain labor counsel to deal
with the substantive issues. In any event, this is a matter that the
courts should take into account in deciding whether or not to defer
to arbitration.
Two other factors that the courts sometimes consider, albeit in
the context of deferral under a commercial rather than a labor ar-
bitration agreement, are the delaying effect deferral may have on
the bankruptcy proceeding itself and the underlying unfairness of
forcing the bankrupt (or its representative) into a forum which
may lack adequate discovery procedures. 82 These considerations
usually arise when the bankrupt himself files a breach of contract
claim against another party, that party demures on the ground that
the contract calls for the arbitration of disputes arising under it,
and the bankrupt raises delay and lack-of-discovery issues. The
interests of bankruptcy clearly dictate that the bankrupt's claims
against third parties be resolved as quickly as possible and that the
success of this litigation not be hampered by the inadequacy of dis-
covery and other processes, since this will affect the size of the
estate.
valid. The trustee in a straight bankruptcy would assume the employer's responsibilities
both in selecting the arbitrator and defending against the claim.
81. In Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the court emphasized that
the trustee, as a representative of the other creditors, had never agreed to arbitration.
That is true, but irrelevant; the trustee inherited both the rights and the duties of the
debtor under the contract being sued upon, even though the trustee consented to neither.
82. See, e.g., In re Cross Elec. Co., 9 Bankr. 408, 412 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).
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These concerns are equally pressing when labor arbitration is at
issue. Although labor arbitration was originally thought of as a
speedy and inexpensive alternative to litigation, in recent years it
has become increasingly slow and costly.8 3 Moreover, discovery
and other forms of compulsory process are somewhat limited in
the arbitration context. 84 Courts must be sensitive to these con-
cerns. If the interests of the estate or other creditors would be ad-
versely affected by delay or other procedural inadequacies, then the
court should either refuse to defer to arbitration or defer only on
the condition that the arbitration be conducted in a manner that
may go beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.8 5
These are the factors that mitigate against deferral to arbitration.
However, in some instances, deferral to arbitration may actually
enhance, rather than harm, the interests of other creditors - and
thus serve, rather than retard, the purposes of bankruptcy. For
example, some courts have noted that deferral to arbitration is par-
ticularly appropriate when it promotes "labor peace." 6 Such
courts are apparently referring to the legal theory that treats arbi-
tration as the substitute for industrial strife (strikes). 87 If an em-
ployer can be compelled to arbitrate an issue, then the union
cannot go out on strike over it.88 But if the same issue is not going
to be resolved by arbitration and is, rather, going to be resolved by
the bankruptcy court, this presumably frees the union from its
contractual "no-strike" obligations.89 It is widely recognized that
a strike against an employer who has gone into a chapter 11 reor-
ganization may be devastating.90 Indeed, it may defeat the entire
83. One commentator has estimated that a normal arbitration case with a one-day
hearing costs each party $2,200 or more and that the average time from the filing of the
grievance to the issuance of the award is eight months. LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK
1977, .t 206 (BNA 1978).
84. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION
133-59 (2d ed. 1983).
85. Accord Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
86. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 431 F. Supp. 646, 653
(E.D.N.Y.), afl'd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825
(1978); In re Muskegon Motor Specialties Co., 313 F.2d 841, 843 (6th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. International Union, UAW v. Davis, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
87. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1959).
88. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970).
89. See In re Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 126, 127-28 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
90. In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), on
remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978), the court of appeals noted that "[t]he argument is made that
to allow picketing in the case of this financially troubled debtor is to put it out of business.
That is, unfortunately, sometimes the sad outcome when a union and an employer can-
not come to terms." Id. at 318; see also Crowe & Assoc., Inc. v. Bricklayers Local 2,
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reorganization effort and drive the business into a total liquidation
to the considerable detriment of the creditors. Thus, where there is
the likelihood of a strike, bankruptcy law interests may weigh in
favor of arbitration rather than against it.
This "labor peace" theory, however, is valid only if the strike is
not subject to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code or could not otherwise be enjoined under the bankruptcy
court's section 105 equity powers - an issue over which there is
considerable dispute.9' Moreover, "labor peace" is a relevant con-
sideration only in the context of a chapter 11 reorganization. If the
case involves a straight bankruptcy and the employer has already
gone out of business, then there is nothing for the union to strike
against and the "labor peace" issue does not even come into
consideration.
The interests of bankruptcy may be infringed or enhanced by
arbitration in other ways as well. The point, however, is that the
effect of arbitration on bankruptcy interests is the critical factor in
deciding whether a labor contract issue should be resolved by an
arbitrator or by the bankruptcy court. 92
VI. TRACKING A PATH THROUGH THE JURISDICTIONAL
MAZE: A LOOK AT SPECIFIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH
THE ISSUE MAY ARISE
The jurisdictional frameworks of arbitration and bankruptcy
have been described, some general principles have been proposed,
and the interests that must be taken into account in applying those
principles have been identified in part. We can now address the
more specific situations in which the triangular conflict among dis-
trict court, bankruptcy court, and arbitration is most likely to
occur.
A. When the Grievance Occurs During Bankruptcy Proceedings
Under section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, a collective bar-
gaining agreement remains in full force and effect until its rejection
713 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1983); Briggs Transp. Co. v. Teamsters, 116 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2241, 2244 (D. Minn. 1984).
91. See generally Haggard, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Strikes.
Resolving the Apparent Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and the Anti-Injunction
Provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (1985); Comment,
The Automatic Stay of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Versus the Norris-LaGuardia Act: A
Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, 61 TEX. L. REV. 321 (1982).
92. See In re Muskegon Motor Specialties Co., 313 F.2d 841, 843 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. International Union, UAW v. Davis, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
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is approved by the bankruptcy judge or other interim relief is al-
lowed.93 Thus, the debtor in possession or trustee has the contrac-
tual duty to adhere to the substantive provisions of the agreement
and the duty to arbitrate any alleged breaches of those provisions.
With respect to such an alleged breach, one of three things
might happen. First, the parties (employer and union) may agree
that the grievance over the alleged breach is arbitrable and may be
perfectly willing to proceed with the arbitration process. Second,
the employer may contend that the grievance is not arbitrable, that
the bankruptcy court should decide the issue itself, or both. And
third, while the union may be content to have the grievance heard
and resolved by the bankruptcy judge, the employer may insist that
the arbitration forum be used, as provided for in the contract.
1. Obtaining Permission to Proceed to Arbitration
Although the parties themselves may be willing to submit to ar-
bitration, once a bankruptcy petition is filed the parties cannot sim-
ply proceed in blithe disregard of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
tribunal. 94 As one court has noted, "there must be judicial control
over the exercise of the right to arbitrate just as there is over other
rights and duties of the bankrupt. For now [in bankruptcy], an
additional consideration has been added, the rights of the credi-
tors."' 95 This is particularly true with respect to breaches that oc-
cur between the time of filing and the court's approval of the
rejection of the contract, and with respect to the liabilities the
debtor in possession incurs as a result of these breaches. These are
technically classified as "administrative expenses," which section
157 includes within the list of "core proceedings" '96 (that is, mat-
ters within the presumed unique expertise of the bankruptcy
court).
In L. 0. Koven & Brothers v. Local 5767, United Steelworkers,97
the union asserted a claim for vacation benefits arising during three
periods: prior to the bankruptcy filing, during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding itself, and after the order of confirmation.98 The Third
Circuit held that during the bankruptcy proceedings "the bank-
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(0 (Supp. I 1984).
94. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 320 (2d Cir. 1976), on
remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), affdper curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
95. Id.
96. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
97. 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).
98. Id. at 199.
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ruptcy court [has] the exclusive right and duty under its basic cus-
todial power to decide what were proper administration expenses
and to shield the estate from unnecessary and improvident expend-
itures." The court further noted that "until any expense was al-
lowed by the bankruptcy court as an administrative expense,
Koven had no obligation to pay it." 99 Thus, although the court
allowed arbitration over the portions of the vacation pay claims
that were attributable to the prefiling period and to the period fol-
lowing the order of confirmation, the bankruptcy court itself was
held to be the proper forum to consider the eligibility and amount
of vacation pay claims that accrued during the reorganization
period.
Although the court in Koven was undoubtedly correct in con-
cluding that the allowance of "administrative expenses" was within
the exclusive purview of the bankruptcy court, there is no reason
why the amount of those expenses could not have been determined
by the arbitrator when it determined the amount of vacation bene-
fits that arose during the other two periods. This was the approach
taken in In re Penn Fruit Co. ,1o in which the court held that:
[a]lthough the determination of whether a claim is entitled to pri-
ority as an administrative expense is within the province of the
bankruptcy court, the determination of the amount due employ-
ees who have filed grievances under the collective bargaining
agreement is a contractual matter which . . . should be decided
according to the procedure to which both the debtor in posses-
sion and the employees (through the union) agreed and by which
both are bound.'
The procedure for accomplishing this result is provided in sec-
tion 1334(c)(1) of the 1984 Amendments,0 2 which allows the
court, "in the interest of justice," to abstain from hearing a particu-
lar proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11. 03 If deference to arbitration is otherwise ap-
propriate, it would seem that the fact that the grievance arose dur-
ing the bankruptcy proceeding itself should not be controlling, and
that in such a situation abstention under section 1334(c)(1) is
appropriate.
99. Id. at 208 (footnote omitted).
100. 1 Bankr. 714 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
101. Id. at 716-17.
102. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(1) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
103. Id.
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2. Obtaining an Order to Compel Arbitration Against a
Recalcitrant Employer
If the employer refuses to agree to submit the grievance to arbi-
tration, then the union has additional problems. If the employer
were not in bankruptcy, the union would simply file a Taft-Hartley
section 301 action, and the federal district court would use the
Warrior Gulf criteria to determine whether or not the grievance
was arbitrable under the contract.1°4 But when the employer is in
bankruptcy, presumably any action against it that is filed in the
federal district court will be automatically referred to the bank-
ruptcy court. This referral, however, is subject to section 157(d) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which requires the district court, on timely
motion of any party, to withdraw from the bankruptcy judge any
proceeding which involves a construction of both the Bankruptcy
Code and a federal law regulating interstate commerce. 05 An ac-
tion to enforce the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement arises under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and
involves an interpretation of the section 301 "common-law" stan-
dard of arbitrability articulated in Warrior Gulf. Moreover, the
legislative history of section 157(d) of the Bankruptcy Code,
though scant, does cite the National Labor Relations Act (and that
presumably includes the Taft-Hartley Act amendments) as the
kind of nonbankruptcy federal statute to which the mandatory
withdrawal provision was intended to apply. 10 6 It would thus seem
that the district court is required, pursuant to appropriate motion,
to withdraw from the bankruptcy court an action to compel
arbitration.
This allocation of jurisdiction between the district court and the
bankruptcy court certainly is reasonable when the employer's only
defense is that the grievance is not in fact arbitrable under the con-
tract. Federal district courts have traditionally handled this issue,
while the bankruptcy courts have not. Therefore, if there is no
danger that an arbitration award will somehow impinge upon the
prerogatives of the bankruptcy system, or if any such danger will
be obviated by the bankruptcy court's ultimate control over the
enforcement of the award, then the district court appears to be the
proper forum for resolution of the arbitrability issue.
This jurisdictional dilemma is complicated further if, in addition
104. See supra text accompanying note 14.
105. See supra text accompanying note 40.
106. 130 CONG. REC. H1849-50 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
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to the employer's traditional section 301 defenses, a claim is also
made (by the employer or some other interested party) that defer-
ral to arbitration is not appropriate for reasons related to the
proper administration of the bankruptcy laws. Section 157(d) of
the Bankruptcy Code still seems to require that the district court
resolve the Taft-Hartley section 301 arbitrability issue. And while
bankruptcy court input on the bankruptcy law implications might
seem desirable, the Bankruptcy Code apparently does not contem-
plate a bifurcated proceeding of that nature. Thus the district
court will of necessity determine both the labor law and the bank-
ruptcy law issues. 107
On the other hand, if the employer's objections to arbitration
pertain solely to arbitration's alleged impact on bankruptcy inter-
ests and processes, then it appears that the bankruptcy court is the
forum in which those determinations should be made. The
mandatory withdrawal provisions of section 157(d) might be
avoided by arguing that such a case does not in fact require "con-
sideration of" a nonbankruptcy law. The legislative history sug-
gests that actual consideration is required.108 Indeed, one court
has held that this consideration must be of a "substantial and ma-
terial" nature. 10 9 Thus, although an action to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement will necessarily involve section 301 in the sense that
it provides the basis for federal jurisdiction, that alone should not
be deemed sufficient to trigger the mandatory withdrawal
provision. "0
In any event, if the case is not withdrawn from the bankruptcy
court and that court determines that arbitration would impinge
upon legitimate bankruptcy interests, the bankruptcy judge should
proceed to resolve the contract issue himself. But if, as is more
likely to be the case, the bankruptcy judge determines that arbitra-
tion would not have that impact (and assuming that there are no
genuine section 301 issues at stake), then he should have the power
to order the employer to submit to arbitration. Since this determi-
nation does not appear to be within the definition of a "core pro-
107. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Miles Machinery Co., 113 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3616 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (district court decided a combination of section 301 labor
law and bankruptcy law issues).
108. "The district court should withdraw such proceedings only if the court deter-
mines ... that other laws regulating organizations affecting interstate commerce are in
fact likely to be considered." 130 CONG. REC. S6081 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (remarks of
Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added).
109. In re White Motor Corp., 42 Bankr. 693, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
110. See W. NORTON & R. LIEB, supra note 51, at 145.
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ceeding," the bankruptcy judge's findings of fact and conclusions
of law will still have to be submitted to the district court for the
entry of a final order."' But despite the apparent cumbersomeness
of this process (in contrast to allowing the district court to decide
the issue in the first instance), the expertise of the bankruptcy judge
appears necessary here.
3. Inducing a Recalcitrant Union to Use Arbitration
A union with a grievance against an employer is not affirma-
tively required to use the arbitration process, but it must use that
process before it can pursue other relief. That is, in the nonbank-
ruptcy context, if the union files a section 301 breach of contract
action in federal district court, the employer will simply move to
have the action dismissed for failure to exhaust contract reme-
dies." 2 But when the employer is in bankruptcy, the situation
again becomes more complicated. Here, the breach of contract
claim is automatically referred to the bankruptcy judge. The union
will contend that the claim constitutes an "administrative expense"
or "claim against the estate" and that it is thus a "core proceed-
ing" under section 157.113 If the employer files a motion to have
the claim dismissed for failure to exhaust contract remedies, the
union will presumably defend on the grounds that the grievance is
not arbitrable, or that bankruptcy interests require the adjudica-
tion of the dispute in the bankruptcy forum, or both." 4
Such action on the part of the union raises issues requiring "con-
sideration" of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and thus allows
the employer to request that the district court withdraw the matter
from the bankruptcy judge and decide the issue itself."5 If the
union's position is predicated solely or even primarily on a section
301 interpretation of the contract, this bifurcated allocation of de-
cisional authority is reasonable. But if the defense is predicated
exclusively on bankruptcy considerations, then the matter should
be resolved by the bankruptcy judge. And in this situation the
union again can argue that the "resolution of the proceeding"
(whether to dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust contract reme-
111. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1968-1984)(unless under § (c)(2) all parties
consent to district court's referral of proceeding to bankruptcy judge for entire proceed-
ing, including issuance of final order).
112. See Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2968, 2972 (E.D. La. 1981).
113. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(d) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
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dies) does not require "consideration" of section 301 at all, in
which case withdrawal under section 157(d) will not be required.
If the district court determines that the grievance is arbitrable
and that no bankruptcy interests will be jeopardized by arbitration,
then it should grant the employer's motion to dismiss the breach of
contract action - thereby inducing the union to resort to arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, if the court determines that the grievance
is not arbitrable, the question remains of who, as between the dis-
trict court and the bankruptcy court, should decide the contract
breach issue. The union will continue to contend that this is a
"core proceeding" which the bankruptcy court must resolve. The
employer, however, may contend that any suit on a collective bar-
gaining agreement is necessarily predicated on section 301, thus
activating the mandatory withdrawal provisions of section
157(d). 116
The employer's contention, however, represents an extremely
broad reading of a section of the statute intended to have only a
narrow application.I Moreover, with a view to who is best quali-
fied to construe the contract (since it is not going to be construed
by an arbitrator), it should be noted that direct judicial enforce-
ment of the substantive provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments is relatively infrequent. Thus, it is unlikely that the district
court judge will have any greater expertise in construing such a
contract than does the bankruptcy judge. Consistent with the gen-
eral principle favoring bankruptcy court resolution of all issues af-
fecting the bankrupt, the better approach is to treat the union's
breach of contract claim no differently than any other contract
claim against the estate, and to have it resolved by the bankruptcy
court.
B. Arbitration of Issues Flowing from the Rejection
of the Contract
In Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Bohack
Corp. ,' I8 the court noted that when the contract is rejected, the law
treats the rejection as a breach as of the moment prior to the filing
in bankruptcy - thus making the nonbreaching party a general
unsecured creditor. But "like any other unilateral breach of con-
tract, it does not destroy the contract so as to absolve the parties
116. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
117. See W. NORTON & R. LIEB, supra note 51, at 145.
118. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), on remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), ajfdper
curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
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S. .from a contractual duty to arbitrate their disputes.""' 9
Breaches occurring prior to filing thus remain arbitrable, while
conduct occurring after an effective rejection does not constitute a
"breach." That much is clear. However, two problems remain.
1. The Status of Alleged Breaches That Occur Between
the Filing Date and the Court's Approval
of the Contract Rejection
On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court in Bohack
held that the contract rejection constituted not only a breach of the
contract retroactive to the date of filing, but also a unilateral "ter-
mination" of the contract as of that date. The question of any sub-
sequent breach was thus mooted. 2 ° The issue in Bohack was
mooted, however, only because the nature of the original claim in-
volved an objection to the subcontracting that Bohack arranged
during the reorganization period. Since the employees would have
lost their jobs anyway, because of the court-approved termination
of this portion of the employer's business under the reorganization
plan, it was irrelevant whether the job loss was also a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. The employees suffered no injury
beyond that flowing from the terms of the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion - thus the contract violation issue was mooted in fact as well
as law. 2 '
But this might not always be the case. Suppose the contract is
rejected, but the affected portion of the business stays in operation.
What is the status of the employee who is "wrongfully discharged"
between the time the employer files in bankruptcy and the time the
contract rejection is approved? If Bohack is to be taken literally,
the collective bargaining agreement covering the employee (which
we will assume contains a discharge clause) is retroactively termi-
nated on the date of filing. This means that the discharge, however
"wrongful" it was at the time it occurred, is nevertheless not a
contract violation and that there is nothing to arbitrate.
This result also seems to be dictated by the logic of NLRB v.
Bildisco,'22 which held that the collective bargaining agreement
ceases to be an "enforceable contract" once the petition is filed.' 23
119. Id. at 321 n.15.
120. Bohack Corporation v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, 431 F. Supp. 646,
656 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825
(1978).
121. Id.
122. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
123. Id. at 1199. Since there was no "enforceable contract," the Court concluded
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If this result occurs under section 8(d) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, then presumably it will occur also under section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act.'24 Applying this reasoning, the court in In
Re Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc.,25 citing Bildisco, held that
grievances arising between the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
and the approval of rejection of the contract cannot be submitted
to arbitration. 2
6
The Emery decision, however, seems inconsistent with section
1113 of the 1984 Amendments. 127 Although a rejected contract is
still treated as being breached and terminated as of the date prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the whole thrust of section
1113 is to ensure that the contract remains in effect and is honored
by the parties until its rejection is approved by the bankruptcy
court. Conduct that violated the contract at the time it occurred
remains a "contract violation" for purposes of arbitration, even
though for other purposes the relation-back theory regards the
contract as being nonexistent at the time of the alleged breach.
While this result may be somewhat lacking in terms of conceptual
tidiness, it makes up for this in terms of fundamental fairness to
the employees.
2. Liquidation of the Damages That Flow from
Contract Rejection
As previously indicated, a rejected contract is deemed totally
breached as of the time of filing, and the nonbreaching party is a
general unsecured creditor with respect to the damages that flow
from such a breach. But should those damages be determined by
an arbitrator or by the bankruptcy court? In the Bohack case, both
that section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), which
normally imposes a duty on an employer to adhere to the terms of an agreed-upon con-
tract, simply does not apply to a trustee or debtor in possession. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
124. See In Re Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc., 48 Bankr. 566, 569 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1985).
125. 48 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
126. Id. at 569.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. 11 1984). This section, which was part of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390
(1984), overrules Bildisco in part and requires a chapter 11 employer to honor the terms
of the agreement until such time as the bankruptcy court approves its rejection. Thus
between the time of filing and the rejection, a collective bargaining agreement continues
to be a viable legal instrument, with breaches subject to whatever grievance and arbitra-
tion provisions the contract contains. But see II U.S.C. § 1 173(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1984)
(granting a trustee power to terminate or alter provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement if the court does not rule on the rejection application within 30 days after
commencement of hearing or agreed-upon additional time).
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the bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that "the
amount of damages suffered by the employees as a result of the
rejection ...[is] appropriate for arbitration."' 28
In most cases, the breach flows from the rejection of the contract
and the damages caused by the breach can thus be characterized as
a dispute "arising under the contract." Such damages appear to be
covered by most arbitration clauses. While the liquidation of dam-
ages flowing from a total repudiation of the contract is not the kind
of issue that labor arbitrators customarily handle, 29 they do have
expertise in dealing with the component parts of such a breach. 130
That is, the damages that flow from the rejection of the contract
will usually pertain to entitlements which have vested as of the
date of breach, such as vacation benefits, unused sick leave, sever-
ance pay, health and life insurance premiums and pension fund
contributions. Arbitrators often deal with these matters and, in-
deed, their expertise may well be necessary to a decision of who is
entitled to what under the contract in question. Damages flowing
from an employer's repudiation of an obligation to make payments
for a fixed or indefinite term in the future, as in the case of retire-
ment benefits or pensions, are also within the scope of an arbitra-
tor's expertise.
Arbitral expertise is also required in resolution of some other
damages issues that arise from the rejection of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In Bohack, for example, the court stated:
[V]aluing seniority rights under the unfulfilled portion of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, as well as ascertaining the mitigat-
ing value of the new seniority rights of terminated employees
who subsequently obtained employment, does not appear to be
simply a matter of dollars and cents, rather it involves knowledge
of the likelihood of attrition and advancement of employees
within the industry and an interpretation of contract provisions
respecting seniority rights.'
A word of caution is in order here. An arbitral determination of
128. 431 F. Supp. at 654. The parties, however, settled the grievance short of arbitra-
tion. Letter from J. Warren Mangan, counsel for Truck Drivers Local 807 (Sept. 24,
1984).
129. But see Dynamics Corp. of Am., 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 674 (Smith, Arb., 1971);
Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1364 (Dash, Arb., 1961).
130. See generally Krotseng, Judicial and Arbitral Resolution of Contractual Plant
Closing Issues, 35 LAB. L.J. 393, 398-404 (1984). One commentator has also suggested
that arbitration of the liquidation issues might make the contract rejection itself some-
what more palatable to the union. See Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy:
The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REV. 539, 603-04
(1984).
131. 431 F. Supp. at 654.
[Vol. 17
Labor Arbitration and Bankruptcy
the current and future entitlements that had vested at the time of
breach would seem to implicate few bankruptcy interests. Once
the arbitrator determines the amount of a claim, the bankruptcy
court can then determine its status and priority and deal with it in
conjunction with other claims against the estate.
The matter is more complicated, however, when the claimed
damages are predicated on postrejection "might have beens" -
that is, when damages are sought to put the employees in the posi-
tion they would have been in but for the breach. As a matter of
combined bankruptcy/labor law, it may be that once a collective
bargaining agreement has been effectively rejected, prospective
damages should never be allowed. For example, where the bank-
ruptcy court has approved a plant closure, claims for entitlements
predicated on work the employees would have performed if the
plant had stayed open are legitimate only on the assumption that
the employees had a right of continued employment, which is to
say that the closure itself violated the contract. 132 This is not often
the case. 3 3 But if the contract is construed as prohibiting a clo-
sure, allowing the full measure of damages is inconsistent with the
bankruptcy court's decision to allow the employer to reject the
contract and close the plant. And even if the plant is not closed
and the employees continue to work, albeit for lower postrejection
wages, the awarding of employee damages measured as the differ-
ence between the wages to which employees were entitled under
the contract and the wages they later received defeats the purpose
of allowing the employer to reject the contract in the first place."'
The court in Bohack was apparently unconcerned about pro-
spective damages, since it allowed the arbitrator to determine the
value of the seniority rights that the employees lost by virtue of the
plant closure and contract rejection. But in In re Muskegon Motor
Specialties Co., 3 the court may have had this difficulty in mind
when it refused to defer to arbitration. In Muskegon, the employ-
ees sought to recover vacation pay for a period which extended
beyond the date of the termination of the debtor-employer's busi-
132. See generally Krotseng, supra note 130, at 397-98.
133. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 321 n.16 (2d Cir.
1976), on remand, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), affdper curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); Local 692, United Food Workers v. Pantry
Pride, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (D. Md. 1981). See generally Krotseng, supra note
130, at 397-98.
134. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text; cf In re Butterfield Foods Co., 83
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1013 (Gallagher, Arb., 1984).
135. 313 F.2d 841 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. International Union, UAW v.
Davis, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
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ness. The court refused to defer to arbitration, reasoning ambigu-
ously that the claim involved merely a "question of law" rather
than "working conditions or practices in a shop."'' 36 Whether the
contract required payment for this period certainly is a "question
of law," in the sense that it is a matter of contract interpretation. 137
But presumably an arbitrator should decide that issue. On the
other hand, whether the allowance of vacation pay under those
circumstances is inconsistent with bankruptcy interests is also a
"question of law." If this is what the court had in mind, then it
properly reserved the issue to itself.
In sum, before the district court or the bankruptcy court allows
arbitration of damages flowing from the rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement, the union's claims should be carefully scru-
tinized and the feasibility of any prospective damages determined
in advance. It is senseless for an arbitrator to make these compli-
cated computations, only to have the claims subsequently disal-
lowed as inconsistent with bankruptcy interests.
C. Arbitration of Grievances Arising Prior to the
Bankruptcy Filing
When an alleged contract breach has occurred at some time
prior to the employer's filing in bankruptcy, the union faces essen-
tially the same procedural choices previously discussed. There is,
however, another Bankruptcy Code provision implicated here.
The automatic stay provision prohibits the initiation or continu-
ance of any legal proceedings against the debtor on claims which
arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.' 38 The
legislative history of this section indicates that it was intended to
apply to arbitration, as well as to more traditional legal
proceedings.'39
In order to proceed with arbitration, the party desiring that
course of action will have to file a motion for relief from the provi-
sions of the automatic stay.'" Such a motion is regarded as a
"core proceeding" by section 157(b)(2)(G) of the Bankruptcy
136. Id. at 843.
137. See L.O. Koven & Bros., Inc. v. Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers, 381
F.2d 196, 203 n.27 (3d Cir. 1967).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
139. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978); see also In re Penn Fruit Co., I Bankr. 714, 716 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1979) ("under the stay provisions ... , the parties may not proceed to arbitration
without the permission of the bankruptcy court").
140. See In re Sterling Mining Co., 21 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982).
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Code,' and is thus within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. The court's decision whether to grant relief from the stay
should be governed by the principles that have already been
discussed. 142
Arguably, a motion for abstention might have the same effect as
a motion for relief from the stay. '43 The difference is that the latter
can be appealed, while the former cannot.1 " In either event, a de-
cision by the bankruptcy court to lift the stay or abstain will
merely permit the parties to proceed with arbitration; it does not
compel them to do so. If the employer resists arbitration of the
dispute, the union will have to file an additional action to compel
arbitration. As discussed above, this action will probably be sub-
ject to section 157(d) withdrawal for resolution by the district
court rather than the bankruptcy court.
D. Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
Like any other judgment against a debtor, an arbitration award
must be filed with the bankruptcy court; the automatic stay provi-
sions prohibit any independent attempts to enforce or collect the
judgment. If the award involves the payment of money, this is a
"claim against the estate"' 4 5 and thus a core proceeding within the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The same is true if the en-
forcement of the award results in an order approving the use 146 or
sale'47 of the debtor's property, or affects the liquidation of the as-
sets of the estate. 4 ' But an arbitration award that requires the em-
ployer to take some other kind of affirmative action, such as
adjustment of seniority ranking or reinstatement of an employee,
appears not to be a core proceeding but, rather, a proceeding
within the "relating to" coverage of section 1334(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 149
Generally, an action to enforce an arbitration award is brought
141. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(G) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
142. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
143. The court in In re Sterling Mining Co., 21 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982),
apparently regarded the two motions as being interchangeable; it formally granted the
union's motion for relief from the stay under § 364(b), but characterized its action in
terms of a § 1471(d) (now § 1334(c)(1)) abstention. Id. at 62; see also In re Smith Jones,
Inc., 17 Bankr. 126, 127 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
144. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
145. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
146. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(M) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(N) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
148. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(O) (West Supp. 1968-1984).
149. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
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in federal district court pursuant to section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act."' ° If the award is presented to the bankruptcy court, it ap-
pears to be subject to the withdrawal provisions of section 157(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 15 ' However, if the validity of the award is
not at issue, status questions, priority, and equitable subordination
should be decided by the bankruptcy court. Again, a good argu-
ment can be made that this is not a proceeding which requires
"consideration" of the labor statutes and that section 157(d) is
therefore inapplicable.
However, if questions are raised about the underlying validity of
the arbitration award, complications will arise. Normally, the
bankruptcy court can "inquire into the validity of any claim as-
serted against the estate and . . . disallow it if it is ascertained to
be without lawful existence, . . . [and] the mere fact that a claim
has been reduced to judgment does not prevent such an in-
quiry."' 52 Putting aside the meaning of this as a matter of pure
bankruptcy law, 153 it is clear that as a matter of labor law judicial
review of arbitration decisions is extremely limited. 54 In this in-
stance, the labor law standard of review should prevail, particu-
larly if the award is the result of an arbitration previously
permitted by the court to proceed. Presumably in making that de-
termination the court has already considered the bankruptcy law
interests and found that they will not be adversely implicated.
Moreover, the whole purpose of initially deferring to arbitration
would be defeated if the parties were later permitted to substan-
tially relitigate the merits in the bankruptcy court. If the award
results from an arbitration that occurred prior to bankruptcy, re-
view on the merits should still be limited; the bankruptcy court
should, however, have the power to refuse to honor the award if
conditions are such that the initial deferral to arbitration was
inappropriate.
If the employer has legitimate objections to the validity of the
award, section 301 issues are clearly raised and the matter should
be subject to withdrawal under section 157(d). If, after reviewing
the award under the truncated Enterprise Wheel & Car stan-
150. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
151. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(d) (West Supp. 1977-1984).
152. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
153. The arbitration of a commercial dispute under § 26 of the Bankruptcy Act was
generally considered reviewable on the merits. See Kreindler, supra note 4, at 35. But see
In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 39 Bankr. 654, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
154. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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dards, the district court determines that the award should be
enforced, this judgment should be filed with the bankruptcy court
before compliance. This allows the bankruptcy court to consider
and decide all relevant bankruptcy law issues, such as priority, sta-
tus, and subordination.
E. Union Breaches of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Collective bargaining agreements are notoriously one-sided,
since duties are imposed principally on the employer while corre-
sponding rights are conferred upon the employees and their union.
The primary exception arises when the union agrees to a no-strike
clause. 56 If the agreement has an arbitration provision which cov-
ers union as well as employer breaches and the union violates the
no-strike clause, the employer will be entitled to both equitable re-
lief and damages. The employer, however, must pursue its claims
against the union through arbitration. 57
When the union breaches the collective bargaining agreement
the fact that the employer is in bankruptcy does not unduly com-
plicate the matter. Basically, the issues are the same as discussed
previously; only the parties have changed. There are, however,
two additional considerations. First, unless the union has filed its
own claim against the employer, the employer's claim for damages
flowing from the breach of the no-strike clause is not a core pro-
ceeding."5 ' Similarly, an order requiring the union to end the
strike is not a core proceeding regardless of the union's status as
claimant. This suggests that bankruptcy interests are more attenu-
ated when the union, rather than the employer, is in breach. Sec-
ond, the interest of bankruptcy in this situation is mainly in
ensuring that the employer's rights are vigorously and speedily vin-
dicated. A substantial award of damages will certainly inure to the
benefit of both the estate and its creditors, and ending the strike
may be essential to the success of the reorganization.' 9 Yet it
155. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
156. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 605-20 (1976); C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 410 (1971).
157. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976)
("Whether the... strike. . . violated the no-strike clause, and the appropriate remedies
if it did, are subject to the agreed-upon dispute settlement procedures of the contract and
are ultimately issues for the arbitrator.").
158. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(C) only applies to "counterclaims by the estate against
persons filing claims against the estate." 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1977-
1984) (emphasis added).
159. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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seems that these interests can be adequately served by arbitration.
A chapter 11 debtor in possession has the incentive necessary to
press the matter in the arbitration forum. Similarly, in a straight
bankruptcy the appointed trustee's standing to compel arbitration
is unquestioned. Delay and inadequacy of process - problems in-
herent in the arbitration forum - might be prejudicial in some
instances. However, if an order enjoining the strike is the primary
objective and the necessary injunctive relief is not otherwise avail-
able,"6° arbitration may be not only the best forum, but the only
forum. For unless such an order is processed through the legiti-
mizing portals of arbitration, it can be held invalid under the anti-
injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 6'
VII. CONCLUSION
Although bankruptcy law and labor law conflict on many fronts,
it appears that an accommodation is possible insofar as the arbitra-
tion of collective bargaining agreements is concerned. Labor arbi-
tration plays an important role in protecting the interests of the
debtor's employees under their collective bargaining agreement,
and it can serve as a valuable adjunct to the bankruptcy court by
providing much-needed expertise on matters of labor contract in-
terpretation. The interests of other creditors can still be safe-
guarded by the general preeminence of bankruptcy law and by the
bankruptcy court's retention of overall jurisdiction for the case.
Indeed, it appears that the conflict is not so much between bank-
ruptcy and arbitration over substantive matters, as it is between
bankruptcy courts and district courts over who has jurisdiction to
decide which issues. Furthermore, this conflict results, not from
something inherent in the bankruptcy/arbitration relationship,
but from a particularly ill-conceived and poorly written statute.
160. Under Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970),
an employer can obtain an injunction only if the strike is over a dispute that is itself
arbitrable. But see supra text accompanying note 91.
161. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). This does not, however, prevent a court from spe-
cifically enforcing an arbitrator's order to end a strike that is in breach of the no-strike
clause. See, e.g., New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers I.I.L.
Local Union 1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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